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W arfare has, for millenia, been a rich source of myth and legend, and one of 
the main reasons many historians proclaim 
Herodotus to be the first to ply their trade is 
because, at least, he discounted divine 
intervention as the prime explanation for the 
ebb and flow of battle. Myths, however, 
persist to this day, one of the most popular in 
our industrialized culture being a common 
belief that technological development 
accelerates in wartime. In many cases this 
might be true; the First World War, for 
example, saw much innovation (this author 
hesitates to use the word "progress") in the 
development of tanks, aircraft, submarines, 
and chemical warfare. In that same war, 
however, communications technology did not 
keep apace, ironic (especially in the British 
Expeditionary Force) given commanders' 
insistence that they needed to control their 
troops if they were to win battles. Though 
much has been said of the impact of machine 
guns and quick-firing artillery on the Western 
Front, another important source of heavy 
casualties was the lack of communication 
between the troops in combat and the officers 
responsible for providing artillery support or 
sending in reserves; 1 as a result men died in 
hopeless, unsupported assaults or were 
overwhelmed by counterattacks after 
capturing their objectives. Communications 
were further complicated by the addition of 
aircraft to the battlefield, with artillery 
observation and photo reconnaissance adding 
the war over land to the war on land. 2 
Maintaining contact between aircraft and the 
troops they were supposed to support would 
be an ongoing challenge. 
An indication of the state of the art in 
1914 could be found in the the most 
technologically advanced arm of the British 
Expeditionary Force- the artillery. Batteries 
could call on wireless aircraft to correct fall of 
shot, and in December what had simply been 
called the wireless unit became 9 Squadron, 
which supplied aircraft and crews to other 
units as required, though its pilots did not 
lead easy lives, as the transmitter they carried 
was so bulky they could not take an observer. 
Further, it required so much space in the 
small observer's cockpit there was no room 
for a receiver, so the pilot could not be entirely 
sure his corrections were being monitored. 
As he had to carry out the observer's duties as 
well as his own, with no one to keep a look-out 
for enemy aircraft, it could not have been 
popular work. 3 Radio-telephony, the 
transmission of human speech by wireless, 
had been under development since 1910 but 
had not moved beyond basic experimentation 
at the end of 1914.4 
On the ground signallers tried to sort out 
the communications problems of trench 
warfare. In late 1914 and early 1915 the 
Canadians in England, still waiting to be sent 
to the front, trained the men who would be 
responsible for sending and receiving 
messages, though within battalions means of 
communication were limited and trainees 
thus concentrated on flag drill and lamps. 5 
Telephones, the most convenient means of 
communication then available, were the 
responsibility of brigade and division 
signalers, who faced an almost impossible 
task; when laid on the ground, wire was 
easily destroyed by shelling, and the Germans 
did not lack for artillery, and stringing it up 
on poles increased its endurance only slightly, 
so the only recourse left to the short-handed 
signallers was to bury it. Finding labour for 
such a task when infantry units, who normally 
provided work parties, were busy digging 
their own trenches and dug-outs was not 
easy, and a wire shortage made matters worse. 
By July 1916 cable-laying was quick, but 
only because an entire battalion worked on 
the project at any given time, 6 and soldiers 
digging trenches for telephone lines were 
subject to shelling and machine gun fire as 
they worked through the night. Wireless 
telegraphy, which as its name implies did 
away with wire, was in the early years of the 
war available only in small numbers, reflecting 
limited manufacturing resources. 7 
The limits of communications technology 
were all too evident when on 22 April and in 
the days that followed the Canadian 
Contingent fought its first major battle at 
Second Ypres, when the Germans attempted 
a limited offensive using large quantities of 
poison gas on the Western Front for the first 
time. As often happened, German artillery 
quickly cut telephone com-munications and 
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headquarters knew little of what was 
happening. 8 One possible means of dispelling 
confusion was the contact patrol, where an 
aircraft overflew the front lines to see how the 
troops were doing, and one of the first was 
during Second Ypres, when the British lost 
touch with units at St. Julien and sent aircraft 
to locate them. 9 There was, as yet, no way for 
troops on the ground to communicate with 
the aircraft that sought them out, and the 
pilots had to rely on their own eyes to pick out 
friendly from enemy soldiers and determine 
their condition, so as a technique it left much 
room for refinement. It was also dangerous, 
requiring pilots to fly low, within range of 
small-arms fire. 10 
Heavy reliance on the telephone could 
thus not be avoided, in spite of its vulnerable 
cables. Raiders sometimes took the device 
with them into enemy trenches, with a line 
crew laying wire through no-man's land. On 
one raid in mid-November 1915 a small 
Canadian assault fought its way into German 
positions, set up a telephone, and sent the 
message: "inandallgoingwell."11 Infantrymen 
also used telephones to keep in touch with 
supporting artillery. Though the system was 
far from perfect, troops often complained that 
"Communication between heavies [artillery) 
and the trenches is one of our weak points,"12 
as enemy shelling cut lines and prevented 
them from calling for retaliation. 
A possible solution was soon 
forthcoming-laddering- a technique 
consisting in laying parallel cables about 
sixty yards apart connected by lateral lines. 
To shut down communications, artillery would 
have to cut both main cables between cross-
pieces. The method was not without its 
disadvantages, calling for more than double 
the length of cable necessary for a single line, 
and requiring frequent overhauls, as the great 
number of connections made for increased 
resistance, which worsened over time. 13 It 
was, however, far quicker to prepare than 
buried line, and served well for short periods 
of time, such as the consolidation phase after 
an assault when front-line infantry needed 
reliable communications with artillery to help 
defend against German counterattacks. 
8 
Complicating the development of 
battlefield communications (as ifthe presence 
of the enemy was not enough) were rules and 
regulations designed to ensure security, as in 
mid-1915 the Germans were often well-
informed of Allied intentions. "Carefully 
planned raids were met by hostile fire exactly 
timed and directed. Relieving troops would 
be greeted, if not by shells, by shouts of 
welcome from the opposing trenches. One 
day a Scottish battalion took over its new 
front to the strains of its regimental march 
played upon a German cornet!" 14 Induction, 
by which a signal travelling along a wire also 
escaped into the surrounding earth, allowed 
the Germans to listen in on front-line 
conversations, from as far away as six hundred 
yards, through loops of wire set up in no-
man's land or even within their own positions. 
The solution, developed in 1915, was the 
Fullerphone, a telegraph which seriously 
diminished induction by way of a sophisticated 
electronic arrangement. 15 Given its 
complexity, however, the device was not 
universally available, and in 1916 signs posted 
in the front line still proclaimed that anyone 
giving away information which the Germans 
could pick up on listening sets would be 
court-martialled. 16 It had a further 
disadvantage, being a Morse system, in 
requiring operators trained in that technique. 
Thus, in the front line, officers and men were 
prohibited from discussing important matters 
over the telephone, nor were they allowed to 
mention unit identities, names of officers, 
locations of ammunition stores, and above 
all, timings for reliefs ,I? The same applied to 
those developing or working with wireless. 
One of the first times the device was used in 
the front trenches was in March 1916, by an 
officer of the Princess Patricia's Canadian 
Light Infantry to control indirect machine 
gun fire. His innovative approach led to his 
arrest. 18 
Such setbacks proved minor, however, 
and wireless telegraphy improved through 
1915. In September the British attacked 
near Loos, and though the battle is best 
known for errors in allocating reserves that 
eventually led to the replacement of Sir John 
French by Sir Douglas Haig as Commander-
in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, it 
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Canadian Signal Section laying cable during the advance east of Arras, September 1918. 
also saw the use of the Sterling wireless set in 
aircraft. Its transmission range of eight to ten 
miles was a two-fold improvement over 
previous sets, and though the plane trailed a 
120-foot copper antenna weighted with a lead 
plumb, this does not seem to have affected 
performance. 19 The main advantage the new 
set offered was to allow the observer to retake 
his place, for by early 1916 he, and not a lone 
pilot, operated the wireless, though there was 
still no room for a receiver. 20 The new 
arrangement greatly eased artillery spotting, 
and was easy for higher authority to accept as 
security was not an important factor in calling 
fall of shot; for the information transmitted to 
batteries was obsolete before the Germans 
could make any use of it. 
Among ground units on the Western Front, 
wireless had been part of the Canadian 
Contingent's communications inventory since 
its arrival in France, when it had eight sets, 
but it was not until after Second Ypres that 
NACPA3080 
Canadian forward observers on the ground 
began to use the devices to call fall of shot. 21 
Communications could still break down in 
the heat of battle, however. In June 1916 the 
Germans attacked and captured Mount Sorrel 
after a hurricane bombardment. As usual, 
telephone lines were shot out, while wireless 
sets in the front lines also became useless as 
shrapnel simultaneously destroyed aerials 
and prevented repairs. 22 In the counterattack 
that followed the Canadians regained the 
ridge, and within five minutes of taking the 
final objective the 3rd Battalion managed to 
get a telephone working and was in contact 
with its headquarters. Aircraft could pick out 
the new line by coloured flags some of the 
troops carried, red for the left brigade and 
yellow and black for the right. 23 By combining 
modern technology- aircraft-with centuries-
old techniques-flag-waving-the British and 
Canadians were learning to dissipate some of 
the fog of war. By the middle of 1916 the 
trend was obvious; there would be no single 
9 
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development to link the various elements of 
the land and air battle. Rather, a wide variety 
of technologies and techniques would be 
gathered into an ever-more complex 
communications network. 
The price of keeping such varied channels 
open was high. Bombardier William Shaw of 
the 151st Siege Battery remembered, "Signals 
came to be looked upon as a "suicide club." 
Fearful yarns of what happened to "flag-
wavers" in that and past wars was sufficient 
to deter most men from volunteering for such 
hazardous duties ... Sometimes the laying of 
line at short notice, to a new observation post 
at night, over roads, fields, across and along 
water-logged trenches, through shelled 
villages and at times in view of enemy flares, 
was a risky, hazardcfus adventure. The whole 
staff of signallers were (sic) often engaged. "24 
Bombardier Shaw was referring to British 
preparations for the Somme offensive, which 
opened on 1 July 1916, relying heavily on the 
telephone, so that headquarters were not 
easy to move, with runners, lamps, flags, and 
pigeons completing the system. 25 
Communications, however, were not up to 
the task, and on the first day of the battle the 
British suffered almost sixty thousand 
casualties, a third of them fatal. Gunners 
had been unable to help, even though artillery 
observation was now the Royal Flying Corps' 
chief role. 26 Contact patrols did, however, go 
a long way towards keeping higher 
headquarters informed of how the troops 
were doing; that first day only the Fourth 
Army's XIIIth Corps on the far right made any 
headway and the aircraft following its progress 
found they could fly as low as six hundred 
feet even in the midst of a massive land battle, 
though pilots might have taken warning from 
the number of aircraft being brought down by 
ground fire. The first waves of infantry had 
mirrors on their backs and the contact aircraft 
kept in touch with corps headquarters by 
wireless and message drops. 27 How many 
mirrors survived the first clash of battle is 
unknown. 
On 30 August the Canadian Corps began 
to take its place on the Somme front and 
prepared for the battles to come, which would 
10 
last until mid-November. Casualties were 
high, and communications between the 
headquarters of battalions, brigades, and 
divisions difficult to maintain. After the 
offensive petered out the 78th Battalion 
reported that the Brigade Signals Officer could 
well have used an extra thirty or forty men, or 
twice the usual establishment. In general 
"Every means of communication must be 
adopted- telephones, visual with lamps and 
flappers, pigeons and runners,"28 though 
experiences differed. The 5th Canadian 
Mounted Rifles, an infantry battalion in spite 
of its name, found that telephones worked 
well but visual signalling was obstructed by 
smoke and dust (it added that pigeons might 
have been useful). 29 The 22nd Battalion found 
its telephones working perfectly and dispensed 
with visual signalling and pigeons to send 
messages to higher headquarters. 30 When the 
Corps managed to advance into the German 
defences it faced the Herculean task oflaying 
and burying cable to the new front line, 
though the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles 
reported that work parties were up to the task 
and at no time was it out of touch with 
brigade headquarters. 31 The 22nd Battalion, 
attacking at Courcelette on 15 September, 
was fortunate in having a wireless and crew 
move up right after the battle; aerials were 
conspicuous, however, and the set drew enemy 
artillery fire. 32 Thus the trend towards 
multiplying the variety of means available to 
transmit information between higher 
headquarters continued. 
Keeping in touch with the troops who 
were fighting their way into enemy trenches 
was a problem that proved almost insoluble. 
After an attack on 17 November the 5th 
Brigade reported that its battalions had kept 
in touch with the front line with visual signals, 
but such ease of communication was 
uncommon, and even the formation in 
question mentioned that it also relied on 
runners. 33 Forward of battalion headquarters 
the most common means of sending 
information was to have men hand-carry 
messages through shelling and, occasionally, 
machine gun fire. 34 After two months of 
fighting on the Somme, commanders simply 
assumed that runners would be the only way 
to get messages across no-man's land and 
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planned accordingly; preparing to assault 
Regina Trench on 10 November the 11th 
Brigade ordered its battalion commanders to 
"send in reports to Battalion headquarters by 
runners stating their location and giving 
information as regards the situation. "35 Two 
years after the war started Canadian 
battalions still relied on a means of 
communication made famous at Marathon 
twenty~four centuries earlier. 
Contact patrols were supposed to keep 
commanders in touch with the situation, but 
the system was still experimental. The 78th 
Battalion suggested that "Communication to 
contact aeroplanes is best maintained by 
flares, "36 but such techniques required perfect 
timing to ensure the signals were lit while the 
aircraft was in position to see them, and such 
synchronization was difficult to achieve when 
men were fighting for their lives. In the 
absence of flares, aircraft flew low in an 
attempt to distinguish uniforms, but as we 
have seen this was a dangerous manoeuvre. 37 
Forward troops sometimes carried white 
sheets, though their effectiveness is 
unknown. 38 After the offensive the 2nd 
Canadian Mounted Rifles suggested that 
"Infantry need more instruction in contact 
patrol work with aeroplanes,"39 while the 
airmen themselves needed more training; in 
an attack on Regina Trench on 8 October a 
contact patrol reported that the 1st Division 
was on its objective, when in fact the formation 
had made no progress. 40 
In early 1917 Lieutenant~General Sir 
Julian Byng, commanding the Canadian 
Corps, learned that his formation had been 
given the task of capturing Vimy ridge in the 
Arras offensive, due to take place in April. 
Aircraft were to play an important role, 
especially in counter-battery work; for German 
shellfire had inflicted heavy casualties on the 
Somme, and Lieutenant-Colonel A.G.L. 
McNaughton, recently appointed to the newly-
created position of counter-battery staff 
officer, relied on the RFC to augment the 
information coming from flash spotters and 
sound ranging. Aircraft spotted enemy guns 
and relayed information over wireless or in 
message drops (they also took air 
photographs), 41 while the counter-battery 
office had a direct wireless link to the air 
reconnaissance unit so it could fire on German 
guns as soon as they were located. 42 While 
destroying trenches, gunners tried to get one 
observation aircraft for every one of their six-
gun batteries. 43 All-in-all the Royal Flying 
Corps faced a wide variety of demands as a 
communications link between gunners and 
the front line at a time when air operations 
had become so hazardous the period was 
later called "Bloody April." 
To keep wires off the ground Canadian Signallers 
use a German rifle as a telephone pole. 
September 1918. NAC PA 3100 
On the ground the Canadian Corps sought 
to maintain communications by exploiting 
every means available, so runners, flags, 
pigeons, and telephones abounded. The power 
buzzer, one of the strangest and hence most 
intriguing communications developments of 
the war, was a recent addition to the 
formation's message network, though the 
principles guiding its use had been conceived 
before the turn of the century. In an angry 
letter to the Royal Society's War Committee 
soon after the First World War broke out, 
Glover Lodge claimed to have experimented 
with earth-tapping as a means of wireless 
11 
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During a brief rest. Canadian Signallers eryoy a light moment resting beside an old German bunker near Lens, 
September 1918. NAC PA 1836 
signalling in 1898 and, fruitlessly, suggested 
it for use in the Boer War. 44 Certainly, since 
the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 it had 
been known that electric impulses could travel 
through the ground, allowing listening posts 
to intercept enemy communications. Early in 
the First World War it had occured to some on 
both sides that the same principle could be 
used to transmit messages without using 
cable; after some disappointing experiments, 
the British turned to the French, sending 
Captain Sir Henry Morgan, MP, to France. 
12 
In his report of 25 April 1916, Sir Henry 
explained the main problem the British and 
French were trying to solve-breakdown in 
communications between advanced units and 
their supporting artillery batteries, some two 
to four thousand yards behind. Telephones, 
flares, pigeons, whistles, visual signalling, 
wireless, and cyclists had all been tried with 
only limited success, but the Captain was 
impressed with the experiments of Colonel 
Ferrie, the then well-known head of French 
military radio-telegraphy. "Indeed I think it 
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may be said that one series of the[se 
experiments] shows the problem to be solved, 
under conditions when it is possible to 
efficiently earth a long wire at both ends in 
the most advanced situation. "45 The device 
weighed only six kilograms and was operated 
by a single switch to set it for receiving or 
transmitting. Powered by accumulators 
(recharchable batteries), however, weighing 
twelve kilograms, the complete set required 
three men to carry and operate. Experiments 
had already shown that it was possible to use 
a telephone with a fifty-metre gap in the line 
ifthe wires were stuck in the ground, but nine 
months of British experiments had not been 
able to improve the range significantly. The 
French device, however, using a fifty-metre 
cable as base-line at the transmitting end 
and one to two hundred metres at the receiving 
end, allowed one-way communication up to 
four kilometres. 46 
The power buzzer, as the British came to 
call the device, was not the kind of 
comprehensive solution that could eliminate 
alternatives. As Brigadier J.S. Fowler, the 
director of army signals, reported in June 
1916, it could be jammed by the buzzing 
emanating from telephone buzzers and was 
easy to pick up on enemy listening sets. 
Further, the accumulators needed special 
maintenance and care in handling, 47 for they 
had a tendency to leak. Finally, as many 
veterans were wont to point out in articles 
after the war, "its one outstanding 
disadvantage was the weight of the batteries 
required for the forward station. "48 The French 
power buzzer was, however, the best of its 
kind, about 250 sets being supplied to the 
BEF in October 1916,49 with some of them 
allocated to the Canadian Corps. 
For the assault on Vimy Ridge wireless 
sets were also available, but only in limited 
numbers. DeForest vacuum tubes, with which 
many sets were manufactured, were difficult 
or impossible to procure as the Americans 
placed themselves on a war footing and 
purchased all those available, while Western 
Electric tubes, the only other source of major 
supply, were not adaptable to mass 
production. 50 At least the few sets available in 
early 191 7 were of a more advanced design; 
for in January continuous wave wireless had 
made its appearance, relying on a thermionic 
valve (or vacuum tube as the Americans called 
it) instead of a spark chrystal. The new device 
was lighter and more portable, required far 
shorter aerials, and had a greater range for 
less power expenditure, 51 while the older 
version, requiring broad tuning, forced a large 
number of stations to operate on the same 
narrow band, where they so interfered with 
one another as to be ineffective. 52 They were 
also conspicuous; the Wilson spark set, for 
example, requiring a sixty-yard aerial twelve 
feet high for a 4,000-yard range. One of the 
few wartime communications developments 
to appear after 1915, continuous wave 
provided a 6,000-yard range with a thirty-
foot antenna requiring only two or three feet 
of aerial, 53 allowing its use far closer to the 
front line. First British Army, of which the 
Canadian Corps was a part, started teaching 
signallers how to use the new sets, which 
were reserved for use by field and heavy 
artillery units, on 1 March, with 40 to 50 
Canadians attending. 54 The Germans had 
nothing comparable, not having been able to 
develop vacuum technology to the point where 
it could be applied to field conditions. 55 
On 9 April 35,000 men left tunnels and 
trenches and made their way towards the 
crest ofVimy Ridge, their faces whipped with 
wind and sleet. The 1st Division had little 
difficulty reaching its objectives, scientific 
gunnery and sophisticated infantry tactics 
proving sufficient for the task. General 
success was reflected in the realm of 
communications as well, as battalions moved 
forward and established new headquarters, 
which relied mainly on telephones. If 
technology had not changed since the 
beginning of the war, the way in which it was 
applied showed greater sophistication, 
especially in cable laddering, which led Major-
General Arthur Currie to report that visual 
signalling, wireless, and power buzzers were 
little used because of the telephone's 
reliability. 56 
The 2nd and 3rd Divisions were about as 
successful as the 1st. The 3rd Division's 8th 
Brigade, and probably others, had stored 
cable near the front so linesmen following 
13 
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attacking troops could run two lines from 
each battalion headquarters directly to the 
final objective. 57 Assuming the assault went 
well, each brigade planned to set up an 
advanced report centre, with linesmen 
running cable up the middle of the brigade's 
area so battalions could tap into it. They 
could also send runners to the report centre 
instead of directing them to make their way 
back to headquarters, and the centre in turn 
could use wireless, telephone, power buzzer, 
pigeons, visual signalling, or its own runners 
to keep higher headquarters up-to-date. 58 
The 4th Division was an exception to the 
day's success and was unable to take its 
objectives. It also demonstrated that reliance 
on a single trunk line was risky; in the 11th 
Brigade's sector, communications failed 
completely and Brigadier Victor Odium had 
to go forward himself to see what was going 
on. 59 There was not always time to ladder the 
lines as the battle continued for the next 
three days, and as D.E. Macintyre later wrote: 
"The trench telephones could be exasperating 
things at times, although signallers worked 
like heroes to maintain the lines under shell 
fire. When a line was hit, both ends would be 
flung far apart and a signaller would have to 
go and find the break and mend it. He could 
follow one end of the wire by letting it run 
through his hand as he walked, but the other 
end might be yards away, and he would have 
to locate and test it, and then make the 
repair, often as not in darkness. "60 
The main problem, as usual, lay forward 
of battalion headquarters, and at Vimy Ridge 
runners once again carried the burden of 
maintaining communications between 
companies and their battalions. 61 Contact 
patrols could at least keep track of the advance 
and send back information to Corps 
Headquarters over wireless or, for longer 
reports, message drops. 62 Thus Lieutenant-
General Julian Byng was, ironically, better 
informed of the troops' progress than his 
division or brigade commanders. Prior to the 
attack, infantry on manoeuvres had practiced 
sending messages to aircraft, 63 the 28th 
Battalion instructing its forward companies 
to fire three white Very lights as they captured 
each objective so headquarters could follow 
14 
their progress,64 but there are no reports on 
whether the flares were ever fired or seen. In 
some formations platoons were instructed to 
show disks or panels, as well as flares, at 
predetermined intervals synchronized with 
contact patrols. Thus, with Zero-hour being 
the moment the attack began, the 7th Brigade 
ordered its troops to signal aircraft at Zero 
plus twenty-five, Zero plus sixty, Zero plus 
130, and Zero plus 160 minutes. 65 The 1st 
Brigade, on a different part of the front, 
received orders to set flares at Zero plus fifty 
minutes, Zero plus 120, and so on. 66 The 28th 
Battalion had a schedule of contact patrols 
lasting ten hours. 67 
Aside from simply announcing their 
positions, advancing battalions also prepared 
for two-way communications with contact 
patrols, as aircraft could initiate a dialogue 
by flashing a code with a white light, or firing 
a flare. 68 Forward troops could then identify 
themselves by reflecting light off a sheet to 
generate a two-letter code in Morse. The 6th 
Brigade, for example, was identified by the 
letters "CF." Headquarters identified 
themselves with a circular ground sheet, a 
half circle for battalions and three-quarter 
circle for brigades. Simple letter codes 
indicated the unit's status or requested help. 
For example, "N" meant the unit was short of 
ammunition and "X" that it was held up by 
machine guns. Thus "CB" space "0" meant 
that the 2nd Brigade had encountered barbed 
wire and requested an artillery barrage. 5 9 
By 14 April the ridge was in Canadian 
hands, on 28 April the Corps attacked at 
Arleux, and on 3 May at Fresnoy, the attacks 
following a similar pattern. Visual signalling 
was limited by smoke or ground mist while 
telephones worked as long as the lines 
remained intact. Laddering was a great help, 
and the cable to one battalion was cut 37 
times before communications ceased. 
Runners were the system's backbone, on at 
least one occasion getting artillery to stop 
shelling its own troops. 70 On the whole, 
however, communications still left something 
to be desired. Power buzzers were of dubious 
value, not only because they required almost 
perfectly flat ground but due to the weight of 
the accumulators that powered them, and 
9
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Repairing wire in a communication trench, February 1 918. 
the fact that they tended to leak acid on the 
unfortunate soldiers that carried them. 
Sources of interference were legion: disused 
railway tracks, pipe lines, buried cables or 
other metallic objects could interfere with 
transmissions, as could telephones. Further, 
power buzzers did not eliminate cable entirely, 
and the transmission station required a base 
line of 150 to 200 yards of wire, rendering it 
vulnerable to shell fire. 71 Wireless sets suffered 
from a similar problem, their weight 
aggravated by the need to set up conspicuous 
aerials; and they were powered by 
accumulators that needed recharging, a 
logistical problem not entirely solved in the 
days after Vimy, as the process could only be 
done at Corps headquarters, and an already 
complicated and strained transportation 
network could not always deliver fresh 
accumulators to forward stations. 72 Pigeons 
were uncertain, though runners were reliable. 
Currie suggested that "It would seem advisable 
to concentrate on telephonic, visual and 
runner communication, wireless being used 
as a subsidiary means of communication. "73 
NACPA2444 
The Canadian Corps would never give up its 
reliance on a wide variety of signalling 
techniques, for it was impossible to predict 
which would be most useful in any upcoming 
battle. 
For example, on 15 August the Canadian 
Corps assaulted and captured Hill 70, and 
here wireless played an important role, as the 
Canadians relied on their gunners to break 
up the inevitable German counter-attacks. 
Signallers could send back quick corrections 
to an artillery exchange, which then passed 
them on to the battery concerned by 
telephone. 74 The counter-battery guns could 
rely on even quicker communications through 
a direct wireless link with forward ground 
observers, 75 but infantry battalions continued 
to rely on the new technology only in 
emergencies, rather than integrate it into an 
already complex and diverse system. 76 
Though Edmund Blunden later wrote that 
wireless was apt to squeal nonsense of its 
own, 77 some were still intrigued by its 
15 
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possibilities, even in the mud of 
Passchendaele, where the Canadian Corps 
joined the battle on 18 October. Four stations 
would provide communications between 
Forward Observation Officers and their heavy 
artillery batteries. Each wireless party 
consisted of seven men, who had to carry all 
their equipment, on one occasion through 
four and a half miles of mud. Teams worked 
in 48 hour shifts, under shell fire that forced 
them to leave their shelter to repair aerials. 
Relief parties brought in rations and water, 
fresh batteries, wire for the aerials, vacuum 
tubes, and at times new wireless sets, which 
quickly wore out under front-line conditions. 
One team needed seven sets in 12 days. 78 
Among proponents of wireless 
communication was the "gadget king," A.G.L. 
McNaughton who, according to Dr. John S. 
Moir, "In the thick of the fighting ... handed 
a message to signals personnel located in a 
pillbox. The message was to be sent both by 
wireless and by carrier pigeon in order to test 
the speed of these services. Five minutes 
were required to send it by wireless, less time 
than it took to get the bird into the air, a 
definite augure (sic) for the future." 79 When a 
final assault on 10 November brought Third 
Ypres, or the Battle of Passchendaele, to an 
end, work on wireless continued. Though 
there had been problems during the battle 
itself, staff officers and commanders came to 
consider the wireless as part of the Corps' 
general communications system. 80 Again 
according to John Moir, the Canadians "were 
more hospitable to fresh departures in 
signalling than the Imperial troops, "81 and 
toyed with the idea of using wireless 
extensively to supplement field telephones in 
the next offensive. 82 In February, 1918, 
equipment became sufficientlly available to 
allowdivisons to allocate sets to their brigades, 
while battery-charging was decentralized from 
corps to division. On 15 June the Canadian 
Corps opened a wireless school, for using the 
device was complex, involving actual 
operation- sending and receiving messages-
as well as setting up, maintaining. and 
repairing the set; thus only men who were 
already trained in Morse keying and ciphers 
were accepted as there was too little time to 
run a full course. 83 
16 
With one campaign over it was time to 
prepare for the next, for Passchendaele had 
done little more than extend the British salient 
arount Ypres and the Germans as yet showed 
no signs of cracking. As aircraft came to play 
a more prominent role in operations the British 
armies sought ways to improve 
communications between airmen and the 
infantry or artillery units they supported. 
Radio telephony was still not available, while 
flares were not entirely satisfactory as the 
Germans could use their own to confuse 
messages and some colours were simply 
difficult to see.84 By March 1918 the Canadian 
Corps was conducting exercises in which 
aircraft flew over the trenches daily so brigades 
and battalions could improve their proficiency 
with Lucas lamps and Popham panels, the 
latter being strips of cloth similar to Venetian 
blinds which could be used to flash messages 
if lighting conditions were appropriate. 85 
Aircraft of a different sort were the subject 
of several experiments conducted by the 
Canadian Corps in May and June 1918. 
Forward of brigade headquarters, which could 
keep in touch with its flanks and higher 
formations with telephone or wireless, the 
most widely-used and effective means of 
communication remained the runner, who 
carried hand- or type-written messages 
through enemy and friendly fire in order to 
keep commanders appraised of the situation 
so they could allocate reserves or artillery 
support accordingly. If it were possible to 
replace these men with some other means, 
they could be retained at the front. Further, 
there might be some way to get messages 
back much faster than in the hands of a man 
who often had to take cover, or might become 
wounded or killed. A possible solution was to 
use rockets carrying messages as payload, 
though the first tests were discouraging, as 
they were not sufficiently accurate and it took 
so much time to locate them that runners 
would have been quicker. 86 By June 1918 
there was some improvement, the rocket 
proving capable of carrying a message up to 
2,200 yards, but even then the impact of 
landing, though not affecting the message 
itself, made it extremely difficult to open the 
nose cone. Officers of the 7th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade, who conducted the tests, 
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concluded that such rockets would be very 
useful in the hands of trained men, 87 but 
there was little time to instruct soldiers in 
their use, and very few of the devices were 
carried on the battlefields of the last Hundred 
Days. 
On 21 March 1918 the Germans launched 
one of the most successful offensives of the 
war, against the British Fifth Army, some 
distance south of the Canadian Corps' 
positions. In April they launched another 
series of attacks against Second Army, this 
time north of the Canadian front. Given that 
their sector was relatively quiet the Canadians 
had the leisure to learn from what was 
happening elsewhere and train their 
battalions accordingly, and in early May the 
11th Brigade issued instructions to its 
signalling sections to practice independently 
and with infantry units. Runners, flags, 
telephones, Popham panels, and Lucas lamps 
were the mainstays of Canadian 
communications, the panels and lamps used 
to send messages to aircraft. 88 The latter 
could communicate with artillery batteries 
and infantry headquarters with the same 
tried-but-true methods, wireless and message 
drops respectively. 89 Cooperation between 
aircraft and ground units had certainly 
become more complex by 1918. The 1915 
manual on air I ground cooperation ran to 
twenty-seven pages including appendices,90 
while the December 1917 manual on artillery 
cooperation alone was seventy-four pages 
long. 91 Aircraft still carried transmitters only; 
for though years of experiment, mostly in the 
United States, had produced radio telephones 
that functioned well in demonstrations they 
could not be depended on in action, 92 
undoubtedly because technicians trained to 
repair and maintain them were lacking. 
The war was about to enter a different 
phase, where headquarters had to move often 
in spite of their heavy reliance on the 
telephone, pushing signallers almost to the 
breaking point to keep messages moving. On 
18 July a French counter-offensive near the 
Marne brought the last of the German 
campaigns to a halt, and on 8 August the 
Allies launched a major offensive near Amiens, 
the Canadian Corps advancing seven miles 
on the first day and thirteen miles by the time 
the campaign ended on the 20th. In one of 
the first such operations, wireless operators 
went to Flanders, north of the actual front 
chosen for the offensive, set up their sets, and 
maintained a steady flow of dummy traffic to 
deceive the Germans as to where the offensive 
would begin. 93 The number of sets and men 
trained to use them had multiplied 
dramatically since Passchendaele; each 
infantry or artillery brigade, as well as the 
Field Survey Section, and the Canadian 
Independent Force of machine guns and 
armoured cars, was provided with wireless, 
while other sets maintained contact with the 
French on the right and the Australians on 
the left. 94 
The tendency to multiply methods of 
communication, so much in evidence at Vimy 
Ridge, continued. 95 Telephones, visual 
signalling, pigeons, message-carrying rockets, 
power buzzers, wireless, runners, and contact 
patrols were all available in 1918,96 though 
brigades were limited to visual signalling, 
runners, and mounted orderlies. 97 William 
Ogilvie, then with the 21st Battery, received 
orders to act as mounted liaison. "There 
being no telephone wires laid I was to be the 
only link between our command party, who 
were following close on the heels of the 
advancing infantry, and our guns, now being 
left far to the rear. "98 A Civil War cavalryman 
would not have felt out of place. The first day 
of the offensive at Amiens the 5th Battalion 
reported that the signals section followed the 
advancing infantry closely and established 
its first station soon after the attack, then set 
up a second station when the advance 
continued ninety minutes later. On neither 
occasion, however, could they contact brigade 
headquarters with lamps. After another few 
hours the infantry's success forced them to 
set up another station, but again they could 
not contact the brigade. 99 A forward observer 
moving with the 14th Battalion had different 
luck; he saw the unit held up by machine 
guns in a wood and reported that "I had 
perfect communications and perfect 
observation, but was unable to use Artillery 
as the Infantry were steadily encircling [the 
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Maintaining links between the troops and 
their headquarters was much more difficult 
than in previous battles not only because 
battalions moved faster than before but 
thanks to new Canadian tactics that called 
for the infantry, with tank support, to move 
directly to their objectives and bypass strong 
points. The 4th Tank Battalion, a British unit 
supporting the l st Division's assault, reported 
that runners could not keep up with the 
advance, but "The Motor Cycle proved to be 
very useful in keeping up communication 
and might be more fully employed on similar 
occasions. "101 After the battle the lOth 
Battalion suggested each battalion 
headquarters have a motorcycle for the 
communications section, for if roads were 
suitable it would provide far better liaison 
with brigade headquarters. 102 When the 14th 
Battalion reached its objectives, it had to 
commandeer two horses to contact the units 
on its flanks. 103 Commanders still hoped to 
impose some semblance of order on the 
battlefield, and the 3rd Brigade's final report 
on Amiens included the admonition that, "It 
is of the most vital importance during 
operations that Brigade be kept informed at 
frequent intervals of the progress of the battle, 
and the successive points gained by each 
Unit during the advance." 104 
Thanks to wireless, commanders had 
indeed regained some modicum of control 
over their formations, but only at higher 
levels. In much the same way that contact 
patrols had given Corps Headquarters a better 
view of the battlefield than was available to 
division and brigade commanders, the new 
wireless organization allowed 
communications between brigades, divisions, 
and the corps itself. but no lower. Corps sets 
had to move often to keep in touch with its 
divisions, which were always moving out of 
range in the course of the attack, and in the 
final days of the Amiens offensive wireless 
networks came under pressure as troops 
advanced deeper into enemy territory and 
divisional headquarters found it impossible 
to lay enough cable to set up telephone 
systems. Information for counter-battery 
work came through wireless, with one station 
at Heavy Artillery Headquarters and three 
18 
others near the line, but again, as infantry 
advanced, communications were sometimes 
interrupted as the forward observers had to 
pack up their sets and move to a new location. 
Thus the main lesson learned at Amiens was 
that units needed two sets each, so one could 
continue operating while the other moved. A 
further lesson concerned training, as the 
number of wireless sets operating in a limited 
area offered many an opportunity for 
unintentional jamming, which could only be 
eliminated by ensuring all operators were 
thoroughly trained. 105 
Amiens was the first of several battles 
that slowly moved the Allied front towards the 
German border, wearing down armies who 
were already short of material and food after 
four years of the Royal Navy's blockade. In 
these offensives signallers faced a major 
challenge just keeping up with the infantry, 
but after Amiens often managed to reestablish 
telephone links following an attack. To give 
just one example, the lOth Brigade reported 
after pushing through the Drocourt-Queant 
line in early September: "Under very difficult 
conditions telephonic communications were 
maintained, almost continually, within the 
Battalion, throughout the operation. Too 
much importance cannot be laid on the 
necessity of an abundant supply of wire for 
lines. We had no occasion to use pigeons, but 
should this contingency have arisen, we would 
have been very short. "106 In fact, at the end of 
the war the British Army still operated 150 
pigeon lofts on the Western and Italian Fronts, 
an indication oftheir perceived importance. 107 
At Drocourt-Queant the 3rd Brigade 
recounted that visual signalling was too 
dangerous as German machine gunners on 
the flanks were able to see and fire upon the 
signallers handling the lamps, so the 
formation had to rely on pigeons and 
runners. 108 Will Bird later wrote that "It was 
often a joke in the platoons that runners 
knew more about what was going on than 
anyone else," 109 even in 1918. 
In the Canadian Corps' last set-piece 
attack of the war, at Valenciennes on land 2 
November, there was no time to lay cable and 
all messages from brigade to higher 
headquarters were sent through wireless 
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stations. 11° Communications between aircraft 
and troops on the ground, however, had not 
improved; infantry carried a new system for 
signalling contact patrols, a white cloth with 
a metal disk sewn on the inside flap of the 
respirator which troops waved when called 
for. The RAF found the devices very useful in 
determining the infantry's positions,lll but 
all-in-all air-ground communications 
techniques in the last Hundred Days were 
essentially the same as those of 1917, and 
remained so until the Armistice was declared 
on 11 November. 
The First World War saw the development 
and application of aircraft, submarines, and 
tanks as effective weapons of industrial 
warfare, while tactics underwent drastic 
change as fire and movement replaced wave 
attacks, and artillery, through scientific 
gunnery, proved ever more capable of 
supporting infantry battalions as they 
struggled to survive in one of the most hostile 
environments our species has ever devised. 
In the realm of communications, however, 
the revolutionary developments of previous 
decades, especially the telephone and wireless 
telegraph, were only partially applied to 
solving the information problems of the 
modern battlefield. As a tactical tool the 
telegraph had already been supplanted by 
the telephone before the war began, and the 
latter would dominate communications 
organizations on the ground until the war 
was long over, wireless proving to be an 
administrative problem even after it was so 
reduced in size as to allow troops to carry it, 
for training a wireless operator in Morse 
keying was far more difficult and time-
consuming than teaching a signaller to talk 
on the 'phone. In the air wireless, available as 
early as 1914, underwent some technical 
improvement throughout the war, aimed at 
reducing its size. There were thus two 
divergent ways in which communications 
technology could develop; technically, the 
telephone changed little from 1914 to 1918, 
but laddered lines, deep buries, and 
sophisticated communications networks 
steadily improved its usefulness, while 
wireless had to undergo technological 
change- miniaturization- to fit in to air-
ground and land operations. Both were 
attempts to impose order on an essentially 
disorderly enterprise, and even in tandem 
they were only partially successful. 
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